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The failure of the Police Integrated National Crime Information System (INCIS) project is the 
most publicised one of many involving budget blowouts in the public sector (Jackson, 1999). 
Others include: the National Library’s NDIS project and the Land Information New Zealand 
(LINZ) project. The private sector is not immune from similar failures, although they tend to be 
less well publicised. The INCIS project is reported to have cost between $100-200 million and 
Telecom’s Customer Sales and Service project (CS&S or ") is thought to be of a similar 
magnitude. The information in this paper is taken from internal and external project reports as 
well as interviews of some of those involved. 
 
Software projects are inherently complex, and complex projects cannot succeed without 
careful planning. A well-planned project can be actively controlled, to do so you must ensure 
that progress is visible. Software projects are also inherently risky and they cannot succeed 
without active risk management (McConnel, 1998). Software Project management (SPM) is 
the first layer of the software engineering process (Pressman, 1994). As software is intangible, 
it is difficult to predict with certainty when a particular software process is likely to cause 
development problems. Software development projects are plagued by technical and 
managerial problems. More than 30% of all software projects in the United States are never 
completed, and of those completed, only 9-16% meet their time and budget projections. Over 
half of software projects exceed budget by 189% (anon, 1997). 
 
Software development projects are different from other engineering projects. The success of a 
software project depends on how the project is managed. This paper focuses on the 
shortcomings in different project management activities and discusses possible corrective 
measures for these. Those covered are transfer of experience from previous projects, change of 
scope, planning (including estimation, scheduling, risk management, project control, progress 
monitoring and reviews) human resources management and teamwork, project managers and 






The project management body of knowledge defines project management as the application of 
knowledge, skills, tools and techniques to project activities in order to meet or exceed 
stakeholders' need and expectation from a project. Metcalf (1991) opined that project 
management embraces four basic disciplines: methodology, or procedures (15%), personnel 
management (50%), communications (25%), and planning techniques (10%). Some projects 
never seem to terminate . . . rather, they become like Moses, condemned to wander till the end 
of their days without seeing the promised land (Keider, 1974). While it is difficult to obtain 
statistics on the actual frequency of IT failures, various sources suggest that at least half of all 
IT projects are not as successful as we would like them to be (Gladden, 1982; Lyytinen and 
Hirschheim, 1987). While there are undoubtedly many different modes of IT failure, one 
pattern of failure that has been observed but seldom studied is the IT project that seems to take 
on a life of its own, "continuing to absorb valuable resources without ever reaching its 
objective” (Keider, 1974; Lyytinen and Hirschheim, 1987; Meredith, 1988). Eventually, these 
projects are abandoned (or significantly redirected), but the cost of having funded them can 
represent a tremendous waste of organisational resources (Keider, 1974). 
 
Major modes of software project failure are late delivery or never completed, poor reliability, 
cost overrun and user dissatisfaction for exhibiting poor performance characteristics i.e. failing 
to meet the requirements (Brooks, 1975). The actual costs of software projects often greatly 
exceed the estimated cost. Other projects are completed within time and cost but do not provide 
full user satisfaction. The skillful integration of software technology, economics and human 
relations in the specific context of a software project is not easy. Poor strategic management 
and related human factors are the major causes of failure (Rodrigues and Williams, 1997). The 
main areas of software project management shortcoming that lead to software project failure 





Effective project management depends on the use of experience from previous projects by both 
the project manager and the organisation. Efficient transfer of knowledge between projects is 
complex as each features unique characteristics. The management team may encounter 
problems in distinguishing the similarities and dissimilarities from among projects. 
Management techniques derived from small-scale projects may not scale up to large systems 
development (Sommerville, 1995). The software project manager needs to satisfy a variety of 
constituencies yet theory indicates good software project management should simultaneously 
be simple, specific, and general. A good theory should be able to explain why the project 
encountered problems and prescribe improved approaches that would have avoided the 
problem (Boehm and Ross, 1989). Failure to learn from mistakes has been a major obstacle to 







A statement of software scope must be bounded (Pressman, 1994). Software scope describes 
function, performance, constraints, interfaces and reliability. Scope is related to business 
objectives and strategies of the organisation. Software project planning starts after bounding 
the scope. Due to the tendency for developers to add to the specifications, feature-creep, it is 
 
equally important to specify what is outside the scope for a project (stage). The development 
time for a large software project may be many years; during that period the organisation may 
change the project objectives and requirements. Management may decide to stop the software 






Planning is a management activity that deals with measurement techniques and estimation 
methods with risk analysis, scheduling and other decision-making activities. A Software 
Project Management Plan (IEEE 1058.1, 1987) describes objectives and sets constraints 
detailing project organisation, risk analysis, resource requirements, tasks, project schedule and 
monitoring and reporting mechanisms (Pressman, 1994; Sommerville, 1995). Software 
projects generally are staffed with technical people, who prefer technical work rather than 
planning. Many technical managers lack adequate training in technical management, so depend 
mostly on planning tools without the proper knowledge of planning. Failure to properly plan is 
one of the most critical mistakes a project manager can make. Thus the average project spends 
about 80 percent of its time on unplanned rework and fixing mistakes that were made earlier in 
the project, leading McConnel (1998) to argue that success in software development depends 
on making a carefully planned series of mistakes in order to avoid making unplanned large 
mistakes. Early planning is necessary to avoid doing extensive rework. While the macro-level 
aspects of project planning and control have been addressed extensively, research on the 
micro-empirical analysis of individual decision making behavior is lacking (Abdel-Hamid, et 
al., 1993). The initial assumptions, estimation and scheduling should be pessimistic rather than 
optimistic. There should be sufficient contingency built into the plan so that the project 
constraints and milestones need not be renegotiated every time in the planning cycle 
(Sommerville, 1995). Planning is an iterative process that is only complete when the project 




Project estimates provide a foundation for project plans. A careful estimate leads to scoping the 
project appropriately, which in turn leads to budgeting, staffing and scheduling it 
appropriately. A poor estimate can undercut the project in all these respects, making it difficult 
to complete the project successfully and impossible to complete it efficiently (McConnel, 
1998). Poor estimation and poor visibility hamper software project planning and control 
(Abdel-Hamid, et al., 1993). Typically, a software project planner estimates the project as if 
nothing will go wrong and then increases that estimate to cover anticipated problems, with a 
further contingency factor to cover unanticipated problems (Sommerville, 1995). Project 
managers have to ask for funding for the entire project before they have had a chance to 
complete much exploratory work. Such requests inevitably miss the mark because too little is 
known about the requirements to support creation of meaningful cost and schedule estimates 
(McConnel, 1998). A software life cycle model is often used to divide a software project into 
phases that can be used as a basis for estimating the project cost in terms of time, money and 
people. The important factors in estimating software projects are: complexity-novelty, staff 
characteristics, clarity of project requirements, development environment, performance 
constraints, human resource availability, project size, support commitments, target audience, 
vacation, sickness, staff turnover and number of interruptions (Schroeder, 1991). 
 
 
Estimates of the completed portion of development work increase as originally projected until 
a level of 80%-90% is reached. At that point, estimates increase slowly until the work actually 
is completed. Analysis of a NASA software project (Abdel-Hamid, 1988) indicated that the 
problem results from interaction are under-estimation and inaccurate measurement of progress 
due to poor visibility. To improve estimates, software producers need to develop and maintain 
databases (using tools such as COCOMO) of organisation-specific software project metrics 
such as cost, duration, error rate and staffing level. Software estimation can never be an exact 
science but a combination of good historical data and systematic techniques can improve 




A major problem in the classical life-cycle approach to software development is the 
completeness and clarity of the user requirements. Alternate paradigms, such as the use of 
prototype software models, may be timelier. Prototyping is shown to be an appropriate 
approach that can be used as a significant feature of the more formal life-cycle process, with 
little overall reduction in project control (Rowen, 1990). Limitations of scheduling include 
overlooking required tasks and the unavailability of key team members. A delay in one task 
causes cascading delays in dependent tasks. The schedule should provide more time than 




Risk management is crucial to good software management project, yet many projects are 
undertaken with no specific consideration of risk. Early identification of mistakes or external 
threats and prompt curative measures should minimise the risk. The project document should 
describe at least ten major risks of the project and the way the risks could be tracked and 
monitored. Gilb (1988) says, "if you don’t actively attack the risks on a software project, they 
will actively attack you". Failure to plan, failure to follow the plan that has been created and 
failure to revise the plan when project circumstances change are some of the most serious 





Software projects might be controlled to meet their schedule, budget and other targets. 
Management of changes to requirements is to be done carefully so that only necessary changes 
are accepted. A quality assurance plan that includes both technical reviews and testing assures 
that the project will not succumb to a costly, defect-ridden build-and-fix model. Progress 
monitoring and review is a control mechanism, identifying shortcomings and anticipated 
problems. Progress is compared to milestones and deliverables stipulated in the scheduling 
document. The PM-Net model (Lee, et al., 1994) may be used for representing and monitoring 
the software development process. This model provides information for progress management, 
as well as information of project status at different levels of detail, for the benefit of project 
managers. The model emphasises bottom-up data collection and top-down information inquiry 
functions. The data flow diagram (DFD) and work breakdown structure (WBS) techniques are 
used for construction of a hierarchical structure of the software development process. This 
process can be viewed as a set of activities, with each activity viewed as a set of sub-activities 





The concept of visibility, referring to the ability to determine a project’s true status, is closely 
related to project control. If you want good visibility, the project team has to plan it into the 
project from the start. Project reviews, unit development folders and computer-aided software 
engineering tools can be used to improve visibility (Abdel-Hamid, 1988). The Software Project 
Survival Guide (McConnel, 1998) recommends: regularly comparing actual performance 
against planned performance; using binary milestones to determine whether tasks are done; 





Project managers are constrained in their choice of staff by factors of availability, budget, skill 
level (the best people may be otherwise allocated), difficulties and delays in recruiting and 
deployment of staff on projects to learn and gain experience. The industry’s persistent 
managerial turnover and succession promote instability, leading to a discernible shift in 
cost/schedule trade-off choices affecting staff allocation and ultimately project performance in 
terms of both cost and duration (Abdel-Hamid, 1992). 
 
Teamwork is an important feature of most software-development projects, but computerised 
project-management systems give little support for cooperation and communication among 
team members. Many programmers do not feel the need to work closely with other people. The 
majority of project management systems focus on planning and control at the top and 
intermediate levels, assisting project managers as far as coarse sub-tasks and activities are 
concerned, but not transforming these into schedules for individual team members (Kurbel, 
1994). Project staff require extensive training in project teamwork. The key steps for the 
introduction of a comprehensive project management system are to create the environment, 





In today's software development environment, researchers, academics, engineers and managers 
are focusing more energy toward developing software engineering as a science in order to deal 
with the growing complexity of software applications. In so doing, there is a trend toward 
losing sight of the product, process and technology for which software is being developed. 
Bridging the gap between software and product development requires effective leadership and 
project management within the software design teams (Pulk, 1990). 
 
Many software development and project management experts work independently as 
consultants,  providing services on a full- or part-time contract basis. Such experts proffer 
multi-dimensional real-life experience in various fields of project management. They can assist 
the company in creating an environment in which it can continue the work and carry out the 





Most software engineering takes place in environments designed for other functions, 
principally business offices. McCue (1978) concluded that the open plan architecture favored 
by many organisations was neither popular nor productive, encroaching on the important 
environmental factors of privacy, outside awareness and personalisation. DeMarco and Lister 
 	
(1987) found that programmers with good working conditions were more than twice as 
productive as equally skilled programmers in poorer conditions. Work areas should be 
congestion and noise free, with adequate light, airflow, etc. Software development is a deeply 





User involvement is critical to a software project in several respects, especially for user 
interface design. Success in building software hinges on building a product that end-users will 
use and like. Without end-user involvement, software developers are notorious for crafting 
technically elegant solutions to problems that users don’t care about (McConnel, 1998). Large 
software development organisations have consciously insulated developers from the user. In a 
case study (Steven and Jonathan, 1994) Poltrock et al. mention that interface developers do not 
know how to build a friendly user interface because they don't understand the user. They argue 
that the interface developers should at least spend a couple of hours a year with the user to 
observe their usage pattern, so that, they understand the user requirement. Authors are 
concerned that the developers may be excessively influenced by the request for features from 
customers who may not be the representative of the market place (Steven and Jonathan, 1994). 
Gould (1988) in 'How to Design Usable Systems' recognises that most designers give some 






About 400 project management software packages are on the market, about one-third for 
personal computers. Most are oriented to generic project or time management. However some 
view software project management as specialised and that the tools should be highly designed 
to support specific tasks (Wylie, 1986). The Capability Maturity Model for Software (CMM) 
developed by the software community with stewardship by the Software Engineering Institute, 
provides the management tools to define a software development project. The methodology 
requires the tracking of cost, standardising the software process, measuring the software 






There is no suggestion that the non-transfer of experience from previous projects caused 
problems in the INCIS project. However the Police representatives on the project may have 
lacked the experience of the (IBM) contractors. The most publicised cause of the cost and time 
overruns was the change in the project’s scope. One major change was from IBM’s OS2 
operating system to that of Windows NT. This change was costed at $12 million. Additional 
requirements to include traffic, firearms and family violence databases have an attributed cost 
of $14 million (Jackson, 1999). If there was a fault in the planning of the project it probably lies 
in the area of too many reviews by a variety of boards and committees (e.g., Treasury, Police). 
In the human resources arena, the State Services Commission identified a lack of strength in 
project and contract management skills. Although as the main contractor IBM could be 
expected to bring strong project management skills to bear on INCIS, one problem was that 
much of this was based offshore (in California) and conflicts occurred. This could conceivably 
lead to problems in the teamwork across the various sites and also between the Police and their 
contractors. IBM would have ample recourse to consultants within their organisation but as has 
 
been highlighted above, this is not the case in the public sector. There was also the suggestion 
that there was disagreement on the project within IBM (Hutchinson, 1999). 
 
No evidence suggests problems with estimation or scheduling although this might be revealed 
later in the official enquiry. It would appear from a review of the project that there was no risk 
management – a factor that would appear to be largely responsible for the failure of the project 
and the failure to take remedial action earlier. This is allied with the problems of the disparate 
project control and tied up with the fact that although there were (too) many reviews (more than 
40), there was little project control. The fact that the phases of the project were so large would 
suggest that there was low project visibility. Nothing was reported about the work environment 
or management tools but it is unlikely that either contributed to the project failure. The Police 
Association did not receive the project favorably (not surprisingly when it was to be paid for by 
a lowered head count) and there was little user involvement by the rank-and-file. The 





There was low transfer of experience from previous projects as most people were brought in 
and largely isolated from existing Telecom projects. Unlike INCIS there were no large-scale 
changes in the project’s scope but many small changes in the delivered project, e.g. Stage 14. 
These were not so much new features but annoying and counter-productive alterations to 
existing ones. However planning: suffered from indecision on the implementation platform 
(Plan A or Plan B – in any event the decision was deferred). 
 
The mixture of human resources utilised caused problems. There was a hodge-podge of users, 
permanent employees, individual contractors and contracted organisations. Allied with this, at 
times it was difficult to get access to key users, or key development staff. The project suffered 
from poor teamwork – there was a low level of cooperation and distrust between teams (but not 
so much within teams) and projects. Although consultants were employed they were from 
many organisations and countries, bringing in different methodologies, techniques and work 
cultures. There was conflict between support staff trying to enforce (changing) methodologies 
and documentation, and the development teams. Conflict also arose with people reviewing 
other team’s work and trying to integrate the various models against the corporate model. 
 
Within stages the estimation and scheduling were unrealistic. The early setting of deadlines 
often resulted in throwing more people at a problem. Risk management was ostensibly ignored, 
although there was provision for this in some of the project documents, the sections went 
unfilled. Project facilitators (support staff) and managers were used for project control and 
utilised management tools such as Microsoft Project. There were comments that there were too 
many reviews and too much time spent in meetings, yet communication was lacking between 
projects and stages. Despite the project being divided into many deliverables (stages) project 
visibility was low on account of the (too) complex business model. The work environment did 
not seem to detract from the project although there was overcrowding. The lack of meeting 
rooms and personal space in which to try to think ‘outside the square’ from time-to-time did 
cause some problems as did frequent changes to the seating and reporting arrangements. User 
involvement was high during implementation but low prior to that. However it was commented 
that the project was signed off at too high a level – the senior managers lacked knowledge of 






The backlog of software development projects is steadily increasing and cost overruns and 
schedule slippage are expensive, but methods used for cost estimation and project control are 
not standardised or reliable. Therefore, management requires a better understanding of the 
process, and a set of simple methods based on a sound, scientific foundation. Software project 
failure can be reduced to a greater extent by efficiently applying the project management 
techniques. A bounded software scope with subsequent changes analysed before incorporation 
into the revised scope. Planning is an iterative process and it should be reviewed and updated 
regularly. The initial planning assumptions should be pessimistic rather than optimistic so that 
any constraints can be easily overcome.  
 
Projects need to be staffed with people having sufficient competence levels, as planned in the 
project document. Staff should be deployed timely and a project should not be considered as a 
training venue for the unskilled staff due to their toll on others’ time. The knowledge, expertise 
and leadership style of the project manager have a big impact on the project. The project 
manager should be well trained in software development projects. In addition, the project can 
take assistance either from the individual consultants or management-consulting firms to 
strengthen weak areas in the development team. 
 
Project managers must estimate costs, time and effort at an early, even exploratory stage, with 
sufficient contingency.  Estimation tools are imperfect for specific projects. They should be 
used carefully and multiple methods should be used. Estimation may be made in two phases 
(preliminary and detailed) so that the detailed phase could consider most of the activities 
correctly. The project schedule shall clearly identify all the project activities and must allocate 
more time for unfamiliar activities. 
 
Risk management is a critical activity of project management. Risk management is added by 
earlier planning including approaches such as listing ten risks or threats to the project. Project 
visibility is needed for controlling, monitoring and review of activities. All the milestones and 
deliverables must be clearly defined to ensure good project visibility. The work environment 
impacts the performance of engineers, so should nurture intellectual activities by being 
distraction-free and allowing sufficient privacy. 
A user-friendly interface can enhance the user satisfaction. It is difficult to involve the user 
directly to the development process but interface developers can design a good interface by 
knowing user's usage pattern in the field. 
 
At the conclusion of each project a debriefing should be held so that the lessons learnt from the 
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